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ABSTRACT 
This thesis measured three aspects of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s 
macroeconomic reforms for transitioning Postwar Iraq; the degree of Central Bank 
independence; the success of the currency exchange; and whether the program of shock 
therapy weakened macroeconomic reforms. The premise behind implementing liberal 
economic reforms in Iraq was that creating a market-oriented economy would increase 
internal stability and would integrate Iraq into the global economy. Moreover, an 
integrated Iraqi government would be less likely to engage in hostile action against its 
own population or its neighbors. This thesis scored the actual degree of Central Bank 
independence at .64 according to the most widely accepted measure established by 
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti. This thesis also proved the CBI effectiveness at 
targeting inflation, which is another indicator of central bank independence. The CPA’s 
program of dinar consolidation unified Iraq’s dual monetary system and helped erase 
Saddam’s legacy of economic incompetence.  The goal of shock therapy was to avoid the 
obstruction and interference that might have accompanied a protracted step-by-step 
approach. Rather than being rejected by a popular backlash or overturned by the Iraqi 
government, the CPS’s macroeconomic reforms remain vital.  Although these reforms 
did not resolve all the structural hurdles in the economy, this research finds that the 
CPA’s neoliberal economic policies have created the necessary groundwork for the 
further development of independent macroeconomic institutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the fall of Saddam in 2003, rebuilding Iraq's economy posed a major 
challenge to post-war reconstruction. Years of war, sanctions, and mismanagement by the 
Baathist regime had decimated Iraq’s economy. The economy required monetary reforms 
to manage the quantity of money in circulation and to control the interest rate.1 
Authorities on reconstruction believed that delivering measurable economic 
improvements could increase the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government.2  Thus, 
reforming Iraq's monetary system was among the initial priorities of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003.3  The CPA issued several bank orders of which 
Order Number 90 and 93 outlined the framework of an independent Central Bank 
modeled after modern western standards.4 Another element of the CPA’s monetary 
decisions was to introduce a new Iraqi currency. By far the most controversial CPA 
decision was to use “shock therapy” rather than a gradual process for implementing 
monetary reforms. Although scholars debated whether the rapid pace of implementation 
hindered the process of reform,5 there was broad agreement that promoting central bank 
independence and a credible currency were crucial to economic reconstruction.6  This 
thesis examines three specific questions regarding the CPA’s macroeconomic reforms: 1) 
Did the CPA create an independent Iraqi central bank; 2) Did the new Iraqi dinar reduce 
political and economic instability; and 3) Did “shock therapy” limit the sustainability of 
monetary reforms? 
                                                 
1 Robert Looney, “Postwar Iraq's Financial System: Building from Scratch,” Middle East Policy, 
(2005), 137. http://www.relooney.info/Rel_MEP_05.pdf 12, no. 1. 
2 Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: Who's in Charge,” Council of Foreign Relations (2004): 4.  
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-s-charge/p7798, 4. 
3 Bathsheba Crocker, “Reconstructing Iraq's Economy,” The Washington Quarterly (2004): 6. 
http://www.twq.com/04autumn/docs/04autumn_crocker.pdf. 
4 Looney, "Postwar Iraq's Financial System: Building from Scratch”, 137 
5 Joseph Stiglitz, “Iraq's Next Shock Will be Shock Therapy,” Znet (2004): 2. 
http://www.zcommunications.org/iraqs-next-shock-will-be-shock-therapy-by-joseph-stiglitz.  
6 Karsten Staehr, “Reforms and Economic Growth in Transition Economies: Complementary 




A. IMPORTANCE OF THIS TOPIC  
This study has important implications for United Sates (U.S.) foreign policy with 
direct application to ongoing operations in Afghanistan and future operations where U.S. 
military intervention may be required to liberalize authoritarian regimes. Whether Iraq 
develops a stable market-oriented economy is also of significant importance to the 
stability of the region. An Iraq that is an integrated part of the global economy is less 
likely to engage in hostile action towards its neighbors or to be so unstable as to create 
regional instability. A developing Iraq would also serve to undermine the statist 
economic systems of other countries, to include Iran. As such, investigating the 
theoretical and practical assumptions behind the CPA’s strategy for transitioning Iraq’s 
monetary system provides insights into the broader thinking about stabilizing post-war 
countries. Specifically, this study makes an important contribution to understanding the 
impact of liberal economic reforms in post-conflict environments.  
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The first hypothesis is whether the CPA’s monetary reforms in Iraq resulted in 
meaningful central bank independence. One of the first economic reforms that the CPA 
introduced in Iraq was to structure an independent central bank.7  Authorities believed 
that creating an independent central bank was necessary to control inflation and stabilize 
the flow of currency. In theory, an independent central bank would prevent government 
interference in the economy and allow banking authorities to focus on controlling prices 
and inflation.  The consensus among economists was that “the long-run objective of 
monetary policy must be price stability, or, to put it more generally, control of the 
absolute level of prices.”8 Concerning the tactic for achieving price stability, Friedman 
claims here too there is consensus on a monetarist policy.  I will therefore measure the 
extent to which Iraq’s central bank maintains independence from government 
manipulation. 
                                                 
7 Looney, "Postwar Iraq's Financial System: Building from Scratch”, 136. 
8 Milton Friedman, “Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
14, no. 1 (1982): 100. http://www.jstor.org/pss/1991496. 
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The second hypothesis tests whether the CPA’s introduction of a new currency 
with a floating exchange rate has controlled inflation in Iraq’s economy.  There was 
much debate about whether to keep the Saddam Dinar, peg the Dinar to the U.S. dollar or 
develop a new Dinar altogether.  The CPA decided to phase out the old Dinar and print 
new currency notes.  Debates also surrounded valuation of the new dinars by pegging to 
the U.S. dollar or introducing a currency board. Authorities believed that pegging the 
Dinar to the U.S. dollar would project overt imperialism and incite questions about Iraq’s 
sovereignty. To evaluate whether the floating exchange rated dinar controlled inflation in 
Iraq I will review official data from the Iraqi Central Bank, along with reports from the 
World Bank and IMF. 
The third hypothesis investigates whether the CPA’s decision to implement 
“shock therapy” reduced the viability of monetary reforms.  The CPA intended to make 
Iraq one of the most open and unregulated economies in the world. Critics debated 
whether abrupt liberation of markets and prices would necessarily lead to economic 
growth.9 I will examine Iraq’s existing Central Bank laws to determine the extent to 
which CPA monetary orders have been modified or overruled. The stickiness of CPA 
reforms in Iraq would diminish the claim that shock therapy reduced reform viability. 
C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
My analysis is a case study that consists of four parts. Part one outlines the CPA 
bank orders, and compares them with the generally accepted theory and practice of 
structuring a modern monetary banking system.  The primary source for evaluating 
currency reform will include the CPA Bank Orders and official reports regarding the 
creation of a new Dinar.  Part two of my analysis will evaluate Iraq’s central Bank 
independence. Sources for evaluating central bank independence will include CPA bank 
orders and other laws produced by Iraq’s interim government. I will measure Iraq’s 
central bank independence by creating an index modeled after the Cukierman, Web, and 
Neypati index, the most widely used index for central bank independence. Sources for 
                                                 
9 Bassam Yousif, “Economic Policies in Iraq: Motivations and Outcomes,” Third World Quarterly 27, 
no. 3 (2006): 501. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600587770#preview. 
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implementation policy will include official statements and reports produced by CPA 
officials. Part three of my analysis will measure the stickiness of CPA reforms. I will 
examine the degree to which the CPA’s orders and intermediate laws promulgated in 
2003–2004 remain present in current Iraqi law and constitution.  Primary sources for that 
analysis include data from Iraq’s central bank, Iraq’s constitution, International Monetary 
Fund, and World Bank reports.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I of this thesis examines Iraq’s economy prior to 2003. Chapter II of this 
thesis reviews the literature concerning the CPA’s involvement in Iraq (2003 to 2004) 
and summarizes the assumptions behind the CPA’s rapid reform of Iraq’s currency and 
central bank. Chapter III of the thesis examines the currency transition and banking law 
that the CPA introduced in Iraq during 2003 and 2004.  This chapter answers the 
following specific thesis questions: 1) How independent of executive branch influence is 
the Iraqi central bank; 2) Did the new dinar help decrease political or economic 
instability; and 3) Did the CPA’s program of shock therapy degrade the durability of 
monetary reforms in Iraq?  Although the consensus regarding the CPA’s overall 
performance has been negative, critics claimed that macroeconomic reform was the 
single bright spot of the CPA’s legacy in Iraq. The thesis examines specific 
macroeconomic policy of the CPA to see whether the empirical evidence supports that 
program of reform. Chapter IV summarizes the thesis findings.  
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II. IRAQ BEFORE 2003 
Saddam Hussein was president of Iraq from 1979 to 2003. His economic priority 
in Iraq focused on fixing prices to manage consumption.  His policies resulted in 
government command and control over Iraq’s oil production and revenues, trade and 
banking, foreign exchange rates, and domestic subsidies.10  During the early years 
mounting revenues from the 1973 Arab oil embargo enabled the government to ignore 
fiscal discipline to garner political support through large-scale industrial investments and 
redistribution of oil revenue.11 Saddam’s economic program was a continuation of the 
two consecutive five-year economic plans that had begun prior to his presidency. The 
goal of the first five-year plan was economic independence through nationalization of the 
petroleum and other extractive industries.  The second five-year economic plan coincided 
with the emergence of the oil boom, which resulted in increased investment in the 
petrochemical and raw mineral industries. Unfortunately, economic management and 
central planning under Saddam was unorganized and the state did minimal actual 
planning.  Infrastructure for the petrochemical complexes in Basra and steel mills in Khor 
al-Zubair lacked the necessary transportation and supply networks. Additionally, workers 
seldom held the required technical or managerial qualifications for overseeing industrial 
operations.12  
From the early 1970s, approximately fifty percent of government investment was 
directed toward the extractive industries of oil and mineral.  This policy was underwritten 
by low interest loans from Iraq’s national banks.  Loans provided by the Industrial Bank 
grew from 12.5 million Iraqi Dinars in 1967–68 to 12.5 million dinars in 1977.  The 
government also granted the private sector legal exemptions and immunity from 
                                                 
10 Anthony Cordesman and Ahmed Hashin, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Bolder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1997), 42. 
11 Jonathan Sanford, Iraq's Economy: Past, Present, Future (Washington DC: Congressional Research 
Service (2003): 4. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31944.pdf . 
12 Cordesman and Ahmed Hashin, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond, Westview Press (February 7, 1997) 
42. 
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taxation.13 These financial distortions created a condition wherein the growth in private 
industry had no relation to Iraq’s productive capacity.14 The expansion in private sector 
activity was reflected in two decrees, the Law regulating Industrial Investment in the 
Private and Mixed Sectors, No. 115 and Company Law, No. 36.  Both decrees increased 
the cap in capital investment allowed for private sector projects and joint stock 
companies. The laws also permitted Iraq’s Industrial Bank to loan companies 120 percent 
of required capital.15 Law 157 of 1973, the Law for the Execution of Major Development 
Projects, absolved “important” engineering and construction industries of taxes and legal 
restrictions.  Unfortunately, the largest projects with the most widespread effect on the 
rest of the economy, such as petrochemical, iron, steel and phosphate complexes, came 
under the tax exemptions of law 157. Thus, Saddam’s economic policies deprived the 
country of revenues from the major industries of growth.16  The first Arab oil embargo 
coincided with Saddam’s first ten years in power. Economic data shows that Iraq's GDP 
was at 1.2 billion dinars in 1970 and peaked at $15.8 billion dinars at the end of his first 
decade as president due to the oil boom.17  Economic growth slowed in the 1980s, barely 
reaching 15 billion dinars in 1985. This economic deterioration resulted from mobilizing 
industrial, financial and other resources to support military spending.18  
A. IRAQ’S BANKS 
The first Central Bank Iraqi was established under Law no 72 in 1956 and 
amended in 1976 under Law 64.  Although little information exists concerning the 
                                                 
13 Isam al-Khafaji, “The Parasitic Base of the Ba'Thist Regime,” in Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or 
Reaction, ed. Committee Against Repression and for Democracy, 78 (London: Zed Books, 1986). 
14 Ibid., 78. 
15 Ibid., 78. 
16 Ibid., 80. 
17 Republic of Iraq Ministry of Planning, "National Development Plan for Years 2010-2014", 42 
http://iq.one.un.org/documents/83/NDP%20English.pdf. 
18 Ibid., 50. 
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functioning of these banks, the available record suggests that these banks merely 
produced statistics on the following monetary and financial data:19  
 Net foreign assets of CBI 
 Claims on the Central Government 
 Claims on other depositary organizations  
 Monetary base (currency outside of banks and bank reserves) 
The Agricultural Bank was established in 1936 and traditionally financed private 
sector agriculturalists. The Industrial Bank was split off from the Agricultural Bank in 
1940 to finance both public- and private sector companies.  Few commercial banks 
existed in Iraq before a prominent member of the Chalabi family formed the Rafidain 
bank as a private bank in 1941. The Real Estate Bank was founded in 1949 to provide 
housing construction loans and to finance the tourist industry.  The Commercial Bank, 
the Credit Bank, and the Bank of Baghdad rounded out the list of domestic banks.  
Foreign banks in Baghdad included the Ottoman Bank, the British owned Eastern Bank 
and the British Bank of the Middle East, the Federal Bank of Lebanon; the National Bank 
of Pakistan, and the Lebanese owned Intra Bank.  In 1964 a wave of mergers and 
consolidations produced four banking groups: Rafidain; Commercial; Bank of Baghdad; 
and Credit Bank. Further consolidation in 1970 forced banks to merge into either a 
Rafidain or a Commercial bank.  In 1974, the Commercial group formally converted to 
Rafidain banks, leaving Iraq with one state-owned bank. In 1989 the Rafidain Bank spun 
off its non-performing assets into the Rashid bank.20  In 1991 after the Gulf War Saddam 
permitted businessmen and prominent families to establish private banks but only the 
Rafidain and Rasheed banks were allowed to finance state owned enterprises.21  
Looters stole three hundred million Dinars from the Rafidain and burned several 
bank branches. The Rashid Bank losses totaled approximately sixty-nine million dinars.  
                                                 
19 David Munro, “Overview of the Iraqi Banking System: The State Owned Banks,” United States 
Agency for International Development (2003): 1, http://www.izdihar-
iraq.com/resources/bankingconf07/bankconf_pdfs/ref_ses5_munro_overview_iraqi_bankg_soes_032107.p
df. 
20 Ibid., 2. 
21 Ibid., 2. 
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Many private banks avoided similar losses by hiding money in Iraq’s Central Bank vault 
prior to the war. Thus Iraq’s public banks became essentially insolvent due to 
mismanagement, wartime looting and losses to state owned enterprises, Iraq’s private 
banks benefited from Saddam’s ban on public sector lending. 22 
B. DINAR INFLATION 
During the period from 1950 to 1980, the National Bank of Iraq maintained 100 
percent reserves behind the Iraqi dinar and the exchange rate hovered between $3.00 and 
$3.38 per dinar.23  From 1960 to the period leading up to the oil boom the Iraqi economy 
held a fairly stable inflation rate ranging between five and six percent.  When the Saddam 
came to power he started a program of rapid industrialization that injected 5.199 billion 
dinars in the industrial sector.  This figure represented a 15 times increase over the 
spending that had taken place between 1959 and 1969.24  The war with Iran produced the 
accelerated printing of Iraq's currency and the Gulf War only increased the rate of the 
dinar's decent. In spite of advantageous tax and bank lending policies, the 14 percent 
growth in manufacturing between 1968 and 1981 was matched by the rate of inflation, 
which was 16 percent percent between 1968 and 1975 and approximately 25 percent 
from 1975 to 1980.25  Thus, there was no real growth in the non-oil sector of Iraq’s 
economy during the first decade of Saddam’s rule. Between 1975 and 1979 the oil boom 
sent inflation fluctuating between eighteen percent and sixty-eight percent. Price 
instability increased as Iraq diverted resources for war and increased government 
borrowing from the central bank. Inflation grew from ninety-five percent in 1980 to four 
hundred percent in 1989. From 1990 to 1991, inflation measured in food prices surpassed 
two thousand percent.26    
                                                 
22 Ibid., 3. 
23 Jonathan Sanford, Iraq's Economy: Past, Present, Future, Congressional Research Service (2003): 
4. http://www.au.af.mil/AU/AWC/awcgate/crs/rl31944.pdf 4. 
24 Cordesman and Hashin, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond, 128. 
25 al-Khafaji, The Parasitic Base of the Ba'thist Regime, 128. 
26 Sanford, Iraq's Economy: Past, Present, Future, 4. 
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C. DEBT 
Cash from the 1970’s oil boom enabled Iraq to finance economic development 
directly, decreasing its reliance on foreign creditors. Additional restrictions on foreign 
direct investments resulted from the Baathist's program of economic nationalism. By 
1989 Iraq was in the midst of a severe debt crisis that even the oil boom could not rectify. 
At the end of the war with Iran in 1988 the country owed $27 billion to Western creditors 
and nearly $50 billion to neighboring Gulf States.27   In 1991, the UN reported that Iraq's 
debt totaled $42.1 billion. Iraq's foreign debt grew from several sources. Loans from the 
Western creditors in the amount of $35 billion provided military assistance, development 
finance and export guarantees. Another $7–8 billion in loans from the Soviet Union and 
other Eastern European States funded development projects. Several Gulf States, 
including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, extended $30-$40 billion 
in credit for the war with Iran.28  The wars forced Iraq to borrow from foreign creditors to 
finance the military and continue economic development projects. Eight years of war 
with Iran buried Iraq's economy under a $80 million mountain of debt.29  The war with 
Kuwait and resulting sanctions dashed any hope of any economic recovery.  Wars and 
sanctions and economic mismanagement lowered Iraq's GDP, increased both debt and 
inflation, prevented foreign investment, and distorted the currency.30   
D. DUAL CURRENCIES 
The Gulf War sanctions imposed under Section 41 of the United Nations Charter 
lasted 12 years, and targeted Saddam and Iraq's ruling elite. Unfortunately most of the 
economic burden fell on ordinary Iraqi citizens. The ruling elites were able to siphon the 
revenue form the UN's Oil for Food program and other humanitarian aid. Additionally, 
imports from the oil for food program distorted the incentives for domestic food 
production.  As a result of the sanction’s ban on oil exports and the resulting 80–90 
                                                 
27 Cordesman and Hashin, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond, 128. 
28 Ibid., 133. 
29 Sanford, Iraq's Economy: Past, Present, Future, 133–134. 
30 Ibid., 114. 
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percent reduction in budget revenues, Saddam could not afford to purchase dinar notes 
from the usual foreign printers.  Left with only a limited supply of pre-1990 currency on 
hand, Saddam authorized the Central Bank to establish a currency-printing operation 
inside Iraq. The resulting “Saddam dinar” carried the image of Saddam and was produced 
using commercial rather than security printing technology.  The relative independence of 
the Kurdish region meant that the new Saddam dinars were restricted to central and 
southern Iraq where Saddam maintained control.  In the Kurdish region the pre-1990 
“Swiss dinar” that was printed in Switzerland held a stronger value than the Saddam 
dinar. The Kurds neither established a printing operation nor engaged in wartime deficit 
financing. As a result, the two national currencies in circulation in Iraq held different 
values: the depreciating Saddam dinar in the middle and southern Iraq versus the stronger 
Swiss dinar in the North.31   
E. CONCLUSION 
Iraq benefited from a spectacular increase in oil revenue between 1973 and 1983 
(60 percent of GDP) as the state controlled the largest source wealth within the 
economy.32  By the mid 1980s, economic losses resulting from the war with Iran 
encouraged Saddam to replace profligate state spending with more practical economic 
reforms that benefited private enterprise.33 In addition to the state divestment of 
agriculture, in 1983 the government repealed nationalization policies enacted in 1964 and 
encouraged large-scale private investments in all industrial sectors of the Iraq’s economy.  
Other important reforms involved drastic reductions in the taxes paid by private industry 
from 75 percent to 35 percent. By 1989, all industries received a ten-year tax holiday. 
Trade policy reflected equally drastic reversals.  Before 1988, all imports had been 
previously managed by the state. After 1988, Saddam liberalized private sector imports 
and promoted exports by lowering the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar.34 Despite 
                                                 
31 Simon Gray and Jocob Nell, A New Currency for Iraq (London: Central Banking Publications, 
2005), 24. 
32 al-Khafaji, The Parasitic Base of the Ba'Thist Regime, 74. 
33 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958 (New York: St Martin Press, 1990), 278. 
34 Kamil Mahdi, Iraq's Economic Predicament (Redding, UK: Garnet Publishing, 2002), 246. 
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Saddam’s apparent attempt to implement reforms, the state remained heavily involved in 
managing and controlling the economy. Thus, rather than an actual decline in the 
influence of the state in the economy, the state merely shifted the types of activities to 
control. Iraq’s economic situation in the late 1980s reflected the shortcomings of the 
longstanding socialist state bureaucracy that had only begun to enact more market-driven 
economic reforms in 1987. Further, economic distortions produced by wars with Iran, 
Kuwait and the United States intensified Iraq’s economic crisis, decline in living 
standards and instability.  
 12
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
From 1991 to 1996, Iraq’s per capita GDP remained below $508. Although the 
CIA World Fact Book on Iraq reports that GDP figures for the years leading up to the 
2003 invasion were unreliable, they report that the pre-invasion growth rate hovered 
around zero percent.35 Iraq had one of the world’s lowest per capita income rates at the 
time of the invasion. The literature on economic development of transitioned economies 
has prescribed numerous strategies for growth, ranging from capital investment to foreign 
aid.36 Research presented by Levine provides empirical evidence that reforms within the 
banking sector may spur long-term economic growth. His study proved that countries that 
had enacted banking reforms to ease credit in the private sector achieved higher GDP 
growth than countries with more restrictive credit policies. Moreover, Levine’s study 
linked variation in cross-country levels of creditor protection with long-run growth rates, 
including growth in GDP per capita.37  The studies highlight unique institutional and 
legal conditions that had corresponded with economic growth. Although research has 
demonstrated that sound monetary policy within the banking sector promotes long-term 
economic growth, none of the growth models had focused on reforms of the banking 
sector.  
A. BANK REFORMS 
Recent studies of banking sector reforms in transitioned economies stress that 
sound monetary policy for foreign and domestic banks operating in transitioned 
economies promote economic growth. As the CPA sought to jumpstart Iraq’s economy, it 
correctly focused on regulating the banking sector. In September 2003, the CPA 
introduced a series of liberal banking laws to liberalize Iraq’s economy. Since that time 
the propriety of those laws and effect of the reform have remained sources of contentious 
                                                 
35 Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq Economic Data (1989-2003),” CIA World Factbook (2011): 3. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2_annxD.html. 
36 William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth MIT Press, Cambridge, Mas (2002), 62. 
37 Robert King and Ross Levine, “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter might be Right,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 108, no. 3 (1993): 605. http://www.jstor.org/pss/2118406. 
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debate.  By the time the CPA arrived in 2003 Iraq had no ability to affect monetary 
policy. The central bank could neither regulate interest nor the quantity of money and 
credit in the economy. No market existed for either government security or private debt 
and Iraq had no interbank system for handling payments. The absence of these important 
markets made it virtually impossible for the CBI to set interest rates and provide 
liquidity.38  CPA order # 40 known as the Banking Law instituted a Central Bank of Iraq 
(CBI) that was independent of government coercion and control.39  
Theoretically, independent central banks prevent inflation and provide liquidity to 
private banks. Also independent central banks are attractive to foreign investment. 
Economist Robert Looney claimed that the 2004 Central Bank Law created a modern 
CBI that was independent of government coercion and control.40  Cecchetti expressed 
confidence in the decision to constitute an independent central bank. According to 
Cecchetti, consensus that has developed over several decades insists that “central banks 
must be (1) independent of political pressures; (2) accountable to the public; (3) 
transparent in its policy actions; and (4) a clear communicator with financial markets and 
the public.”41  Of the listed requirements, Cecchetti highlighted independence as the most 
important. 
Other experts argued that central bank independence would be difficult to obtain 
under the best circumstances. Success would be much less attainable in Iraq given the 
country’s post-war institutional deficit.  “Simply put, no central bank can be independent 
without a strong dose of fiscal control…Indeed, so long as there is a central bank, Iraqi 
governments will have less incentive to follow the rules of fiscal prudence. Faced with a 
soft budget constraint, the fiscal authorities will force the central bank to cooperate in 
financing its deficits.”42  
                                                 
38 Looney, Postwar Iraq's Financial System: Building from Scratch, 138. 
39 Ibid., 137. 
40 Ibid., 137. 
41 Stephen Cecchetti, “How to Establish a Credible Iraqi Central Bank,” International Economy 
(2003): 85. http://international-economy.com/TIE_Su03_Cecchetti.pdf. 
42 Steve Hanke and Matt Sekerke, “Monetary Options for Postwar Iraq,” Foreign Policy Briefing 80, 
no. 80 (2003): 6. http://www.jhu.edu/~iaesbe/Iraq.pdf. 
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B. SHOCK THERAPY 
Although there was agreement in 2003 about the propriety of market-based 
reforms, debates surfaced about how best to implement those reforms. Proponents of 
“shock therapy” believed that fragmented reforms were ineffective and argued instead 
that comprehensive liberalization would both concentrate and minimize hardships. 
Gradualists argued in favor of reforms applied sequentially within specific sectors and 
among a defined set of activities.43 The Coalition policies in Iraq followed the first 
approach. 
In Baghdad Year Zero, Naomi Klein takes issue, not only with the radical 
liberalism/idealism of the CPA bank reform, but also with the “shock therapy” with 
which they were implemented. Klein had argued that Bremer's economic reforms/ 
investment laws might have shocked Iraq’s businessmen into more profitable 
arrangements such as funding the insurgency.44  Bassam Yousif agreed that the CPA 
banking sector reforms had succeeded in making Iraq one of the most open and 
unregulated economies in the world. But, he argued, sustained growth would not be 
achievable because the abrupt liberation in markets and prices had not corresponded with 
bank lending to the private sector to increase the capacity of production. “Investment 
difficulties in Iraq have stemmed not from the lack of financial capital but from the low 
capacity of the economy to absorb investments...this underscores the importance of 
financial assistance to the success of shock therapy and brings out an interesting irony to 
this approach.”45  Yousif saw parallels in CPA reforms and Iraq's bank nationalization in 
1964 that eroded the rights of domestic industrial and commercial businesses.  “Hasty 
and inappropriate Coalition policies have therefore reinforced the extant anxieties about 
the market and buttressed the traditionally tentative character of property rights.”46  
Christopher Coyne predicted that the CPA's economic reforms would be unsuccessful 
                                                 
43 Naomi Klein, “Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia,” Harpers 
Magazine (2004): 44. http://harpers.org/archive/2004/09/0080197. 
44 Ibid., 48.  
45 Yousif, Economic Policies in Iraq: Motivations and Outcomes, 501. 
46 Ibid., 502. 
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because policy makers ignored “reconstruction traps” of credible commitment, political 
economy, bureaucracy and fatal conceit.  His specific argument against shock therapy 
was that since policy makers could never understand the entire economy, gradual reforms 
would invariably outperform simultaneous comprehensive changes. “In the case of Iraq, 
the CPA attempted to dictate the foundations of a free-market economy through its 100 
Orders. The underlying assumptions were that these reforms would be effectively 
implemented and that they would sustain and operate in the desired manner. These 
assumptions neglected not only the reconstruction traps discussed above, but also the 
array of complementary informal institutions necessary for well-functioning markets.”47     
Starr has argued that creating viable mechanisms for monetary policy is a matter 
of governance.  “Without a credible currency and minimal payments system, the 
government cannot make payments to employees or suppliers, prolonging problems of 
lack of cohesion and control.”48  Starr's research examined case studies and econometric 
analyses of monetary reforms in nine transitioned countries and concluded that the 
correct policy prescription is context dependent. “What matters most is moving money 
out of the realm of powers and authorities used to the benefit of some parties to a conflict, 
and into the realm where it serves the common good.49   
Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom have found positive correlation between 
economic growth and conflict reduction in transitioned countries.50  Their study involved 
statistical analysis of 66 post-conflict cases through which they determined that economic 
recovery substantially contributes to risk reduction.51  Studies by Miguel et al. have also 
identified the importance of economic growth for risk reduction in Africa. Miguel et al. 
Ran regression analyses on a database of conflicts developed by the International Peace 
                                                 
47 Christopher Coyne, “The Economic Reconstruction of Iraq”, 28. 
48 Martha Starr, “Monetary Policy in Post-Conflict Countries: Restoring Credibility” (Working Paper, 
American University, Washington DC, 2004): 4 http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/1961/4946/1/2004-
07.pdf . 
49 Ibid., 4. 
50 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” Journal of Peace Research 
45, no. 4 (2008): 3. http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/45/4/461.full.pdf+html. 
51 Ibid., 15. 
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Research Institute of Oslo, Norway. The researchers found that GDP growth was 
significantly negatively related to the incidence of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa from 
1981–1999.52   
C. CURRENCY REFORM 
Prior to 2003, Baathist mismanagement, wars, and international sanctions crippled 
Iraq’s economy. Compounding matters was the fact that Iraq's central bank and two state 
banks were systematically looted.53 In 2003, two denominations of Iraqi dinars circulated 
within the economy. Since both “Saddam” and “Swiss” dinars featured the visage of a 
smiling Saddam Hussein, authorities feared that Iraq’s currency would collapse after 
regime change. During the post-war chaos the presses, plates and paper for printing 
currency were stolen, leading to fears of widespread counterfeiting.54 Given these 
circumstances, the CPA deemed it necessary to introduce a new currency in Iraq.  
Authorities contemplated alternatives ranging from simply adopting the “Swiss” version 
of the Dinar, dollarizing the economy or adopting a new currency with a floating 
exchange rate.55 They argued that the authorities settled on a floating exchange rate 
currency in order to adjust to external shocks resulting from the price of oil, Iraq's 
primary export. But the preoccupation on external shocks allowed authorities to overlook 
the fact that there were no institutional barriers to prevent the “internal shock” of 
extensive government manipulation of Iraq's central bank in practice.56 The authors 
promoted either a currency board or dollarization as superior alternatives to developing a 
central bank in Iraq.57 Foote agreed with Hanke and Sekerke that dollarization would 
                                                 
52 Edward Miguel, Ernest Sergenti and Shanker Satyanath, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An 
Instrumental Variables Approach” (Working Paper, Working Paper, University of California, 2003): 727 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/pdfs/miguel_conflict.pdf. 
53 Looney, Postwar Iraq's Financial System: Building from Scratch, 136. 
54 Foote et al., “Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 3 
(2004): 60, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3216806.pdf. 
55 Ibid., 60. 
56 Hanke and Sekerke, Monetary Options for Postwar Iraq, 8. 
57 Ibid., 8–12. 
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have been a better option for real currency reform. But, he argued, political symbolism 
and security concerns convinced authorities to forgo the dollar and to create new dinars.58   
Looney claimed that while fixing the currency for a brief period during transition 
might have reduced extreme fluctuations in the exchange rate, pegging the Dinar to the 
dollar would have appeared imperial and produced interest-rate movements counter to 
Iraq's best interests.59  Thus dollarization and the Swiss dinar were rejected for political 
reasons. To rid the currency of Saddam’s legacy and signal Iraq’s economic sovereignty 
the CPA decided on a new dinar with a “managed” floating currency regime to control 
the exchange rate. Under this arrangement, the CBI could retain the air of economic 
sovereignty and freely purchase U.S, dollars to weaken an excessively strong Dinar or 
sell dollars if the Dinar depreciates too rapidly.60  Bathsheba Crocker also saw value in 
the new dinar. Although she opined that the CPA's banking laws were implemented top-
down and did not reflect Islamic law, she believed that instituting a new Dinar was “one 
of the CPA's most successful reforms.”61   
D. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
There is no blueprint for broad economic reconstruction or consensus among 
economists about the best way to pursue macroeconomic reform during a transition.62  
However, there was broad agreement that establishing a stable monetary system would be 
supportive of reconstruction.63 Political considerations of the CPA played a major role in 
economic decisions. Each policy decision was surrounded by intense controversy and 
debate. Specific questions remain. What were the CPA’s motivations for new floating 
                                                 
58 Foote et al., Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq, 61. 
59 Looney, Postwar Iraq's Financial System: Building from Scratch, 140-141. 
60 Ibid., 73. 
61 Crocker, Reconstructing Iraq's Economy, 73. 
62 Peter Murrell, “Evolution in Economics and in the Economics and in the Economic Reform of the 
Centrally Planned Economies,” in Emerging Market Economies in Europe (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 
1992): 5, http://econweb.umd.edu/~murrell/articles/Evolution%20in%20Economics.pdf. 
63 Ross Levine, “The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth,” Journal of 




currency? What were alternatives to an independent central bank ignored? Why did the 
CPA’s opt for a rapid pace of reforms?  The literature sufficiently examines mainly 
theoretical questions, offering both ideological and practical justifications for the CPA’s 
decisions.  The CPA’s overall goal was developing a functioning financial system in Iraq. 
Without a functioning financial system, the transitioning government could neither secure 
loans nor pay workers, prolonging the lack of cohesion and control.64 Thus, establishing 
a thriving and legitimate financial system is important to the post-war recovery. After all, 
what matters in an economy is not the wealth of a privileged few but the benefit of the 
common good.65 Just how independent from government influence is the Iraqi central 
bank? How useful has the floating exchange rate been at controlling inflation?  How 
many of the CPA’s initial Central Bank reforms remain in Iraq? These questions are 
unanswered by the existing primarily theoretical literature. Therefore this thesis will 
conduct an empirical investigation of the CPA’s macroeconomic reforms.  
                                                 
64 Starr, Monetary Policy in Post-Conflict Countries: Restoring Credibility, 4. 
65 Ibid., 5. 
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IV. THE CPA 
 
Figure 1.   CPA Organization Chart66 
A. WHAT WAS THE CPA? 
The Coalition Provisional Authority was established on April 9, 2003 with a 
mission to "restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the 
Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, (including by advancing 
efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative 
governance) and facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and 
development."67 The constitution and authority of the CPA was unclear. "The CPA was, 
                                                 
66 Elaine Halchin, “The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and 
Institutional Authorities”, CRS Report to Congress, June, 2005,: 30, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA458968&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
67 Ibid., 1. 
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at one and the same time, an element of the Defense department, a multinational 
organization, and a foreign government."68 The United States Congress expressed initial 
concerns about the identity of the CPA.  
It is unclear whether the CPA is a federal a federal agency. Competing, 
though not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations for how it was 
established contribute to the uncertainty about its status. The lack of an 
authoritative and unambiguous statement about how this organization was 
established, by whom and under what authority leaves open many 
questions, particularly in the areas of oversight and accountability. Some 
executive branch documents support the notion that it was created by the 
President, possibly as a result of the National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD)…The other possibility is that the authority was created 
by, or pursuant to, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 
(2003).69 
Questions about whether the CPA was a federal agency or an international 
organization remained ambiguous and led to confusion about its organizational status and 
authority.70 To resolve the issue of ambiguity, the U.S. Justice Department issued the 
following statement: 
The CPA was created by the Commander of the Commander of the 
Coalition Forces in Iraq, General Tommy Franks, United States Army, 
who was also the Commander of the U.S. Central Command. The 
establishment of the CPA by the Coalition was formally recognized by 
UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483]. Since the 
Coalition Forces had established and exercised actual authority of the 
territory of Iraq, under the laws of war and occupation, the authority of the 
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69Adam Roberts, “The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004”, The University Oxford Programme on the 
Changing Character of War, (2004):35, 
http://ccw.modhist.ox.ac.uk/publications/roberts_ICLQarticle_Iraq_2004.pdf. 
70 Institutional Authorities, CRS Report to Congress, (June, 2005),: 9, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
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Coalition Forces. General Franks established the CPA under the laws of 
war to perform civil government functions in liberated Iraq during the 
brief occupation.71 
Confusion about the CPA’s organizational status and authority persisted despite the 
Justice Department declaration.  
B. WHO WAS THE CPA? 
In staffing the CPA, Paul Bremer attempted to recruit a cadre of experienced 
civilians from the United States. However, frequent staff turnovers and a lack of 
volunteers forced him to rely heavily on military appointments.72  Paul Bremer headed 
the CPA as lead administrator exercising supreme executive, legislative and judicial 
control.  Bremer had the power to issue four types of decrees:73 
 Regulations – used to define the institutions and authorities of the CPA 
 Orders – directives that had the power to alter existing Iraqi law. Most significantly, 
Orders 56 (Central Bank Order) and Order 43 that focused on reforming Iraq's 
banking industry 
 Memoranda – expansions or modifications to CPA orders and regulations 
 Public Notices – public relations messages that communicated the CPA intentions to 
the Iraqi people 
C. IMPLICATION OF CPA’S STATUS 
The CPA was organized into numerous staffs, line offices, senior advisors and 
other strategic units. The Office of Economic Policy, initially headed by Peter 
McPherson, oversaw the several ministries, including trade and the Iraqi central bank. 
During the initial months of operations, the CPA senior officials ran Iraqi's ministries 
under intense pressure to both quickly transfer power to Iraqis and to forestall the rise to 
power of spoilers, such the Iranian linked Islamist parties, the Supreme Council of the 
Islamic Revolution and the Da'wa Party.74   
                                                 
71 Dobbins et al., “Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority”, Rand National 
Security Research Division, (2009):13, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.pdf. 
72 Ibid., 14-15. 
73 Ibid., 16. 
74 Ibid., 43. 
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Another implication had to do with the legal authority of the CPA operations in 
Iraq in the absence of an elected Iraqi government. The worry was that elected officials 
would not only challenge the CPA's authority, but also overturn the CPA orders.75  The 
CPA's first regulation highlighted the tenuous legal hold. "Regulations and Orders will 
remain in force until repealed by the Administrator or superseded by legislation issued by 
the democratic institutions of Iraq."76 These survivability concerns were attenuated after 
Elections held in August 2003 installed Iraqi Governing Council made up of ministers 
who were vetted by the CPA.77   
 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 45 
76 Ibid., 28. 
77 Ibid., 45. 
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V. CPA MACROECONOMIC REFORMS  
In 2003, at the Baghdad headquarters in Iraq’s Green Zone, the CPA assessed the 
country’s postwar condition.  A total of three wars lasting almost a decade and 12 years 
of sanctions had reduced Iraq’s per capita GDP to approximately $1,000 USD.  The CPA 
concluded that Iraq’s reconstruction and long-term stability required rapid reform of the 
economy.78   Reform goals included unifying the dual currencies in the northern and 
southern parts of the country, creating a credible monetary policy, and equipping Iraq’s 
central bank with the tools necessary to control inflation.79  Authorities believed that 
implementing these reforms at the rapid speed of Shock Therapy would prevent 
interference from Baathists and others interlopers. Iraq had been a cash economy under 
Saddam and few Iraqis had bank accounts. The two major banks, the Rafidain and 
Rasheed, had 340 branches that completely unconnected. “No branch would honor the 
checks of another branch, and the head honcho of the Central bank personally had to 
approve any transfer of funds across the border of Iraq. The banks were merely vaults for 
deposits of funds…Very few Iraqis had ever been in a bank.”80  On July 7th, 2003 Paul 
Bremer announced that a major component of reconstructing Iraq’s macro-economy 
involved banking reform and unifying of Iraq’s currency. Additional reforms involved 
creating an independent central bank with the capability of setting monetary policy 
including the rate of currency exchange.81  
A. REFORM OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ 
CPA Bank Order 18 and 56 outlined the structure, objectives and independence of 
Iraq’s Central Bank (CBI). The purpose of the CBI was to achieve domestic price 
stability, foster a competitive market-based financial system, and promote sustainable 
growth, employment, and prosperity in Iraq. With an initial staff of nearly 3,500, and 
                                                 
78 Gray and Nell, A New Currency for Iraq, 19. 
79 Ibid., 5–6. 
80 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” Global Security November, no. November (2003): 
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three preliminary branches in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, the CBI attempted to integrate 
the Kurdish central banks into a single Iraqi dinar and to coordinate the previously 
independent branches of the Rasheed and Rafidan banks. After several meetings with it 
head of the Kurdish central banks, the CPA reached agreements on Kurdish bank 
integration under the principle of one country, one currency, one central bank.82  The 
CPA also coordinated with leadership of the Rasheed and Rafidan banks to approve the 
New Dinar Currency Exchange Instructions and to identify the bank branches capable of 
becoming exchange sites for the new currency.83  The CPA initially established reserve 
requirements on bank deposits as follows:84  
 Savings Accounts 5 percent 
 Time Deposits 10 percent 
 Current and Other Accounts 20 percent 
Minimum rates banks must pay on deposits are: 
 Savings Accounts 7 percent 
 Six month time deposits 8 percent 
 One year time deposits 9 percent 
 Two year time deposits 10 percent 
The maximum lending rates that banks could charge were formerly declared as follows:85  
 
 Short-term loans and advances 14 percent 
 Medium-term (to five years) 15 percent 
 Long-term (over five years) 16 percent 
At the conclusion of the meetings between senior officials in Iraq’s Ministry of 
Finance, the Central Bank in Baghdad, Kurdish leaders, and the CPA, all agreed that 
rapidly installing a single currency could underpin economic and political stability. Paul 
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Bremer contrasted his plan for rapid economic reforms with slow pace of economic 
reconstruction in Germany and the more recent case of Afghanistan where it had taken 
two years to replace that country’s currency.86  
B EVALUATION OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE  
On October 14, 2003, Paul Bremer signed Order 43, authorizing the CBI as the 
sole authority in Iraq to issue legal tender.87  Bank order 18 repealed the provisions of 
Saddam’s earlier bank laws that had authorized the CBI to make loans to the Iraqi 
Government Ministries. Section two of Bank Order 18 prohibited the Ministry of Finance 
from interfering with the CBI’s authority to set monetary and credit policy.88  Thus legal 
central bank independence was instituted. But the measure of central bank independence 
required evaluating bank policy in practice. In 1992 Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 
introduced the widely accepted model and range of indicators for measuring central bank 
independence vis-à-vis inflation targeting. Their model included the examination of 
central bank law, a questionnaire, and an assessment of the Chief Operation Executive 
tenure.89  Since this thesis does not include a survey of CBI governors, a modified 
version of the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti model will be used to evaluate the 
independence of Iraq’s central bank. This modified version of the model involves an 
assessment of the CBI laws according to Cukierman matrix, an examination of the tenure 
of the CBI chief executive and an evaluation of the CBI performance at targeting 
inflation. 
1. Description of the Model  
Four clusters of central bank characteristics are used to code legal independence. 
The clusters are: 
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 Appointment, dismissal, and term of office of chief executive officer 
(CEO) 
 Autonomy from executive branch for monetary policy formation- 
 Objectives of the central bank 
 Limitations on central bank lending to the private sector 
The clusters are comprised of sixteen different legal variables that are coded on a 
scale of 0 (lowest level of independence) to 1 (highest level of independence).  The 
detailed list of both classification and coding appear in table 1. The following criteria are 
used for coding the various levels of independence. The length in tenure of the CEO 
combined with the absence of the executive branch involvement in appointment and 
dismissal procedures indicate greater independence in the CEO dimension.  Higher 
values for autonomy indicate greater central bank independence at policy formation. 
There are six possible ratings for central bank objectives. The ratings are coded to 
preference banks with a legal mandate for price stability as their singular goal. Thus a 
bank charter that states price stability for its objective is classified as more independent in 
this dimension compared to other stated objectives. A high measure for limitations on 
lending to the private sector indicates lower independence. In contrast, a high value for 
limits on lending to the public sector indicates greater independence in this cluster. 
Table 1.   Variables for Legal Central Bank Independence 
 
Variables for Legal Central Bank Independence 
  
Variable    Coding 




(CEO)  0.2  
 a.  Term in office   
  Over 8 years  1 
  6 to 8 years  0.75 
  5 years  0.5 
  4 years  0.25 
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Variables for Legal Central Bank Independence 
  
  
Under 4 years or at the discretion of 
appointer  0 
 b. Who appoints CEO?   
  Board of central bank  1 
  
A council of the central bank board, 
executive branch, and legislative branch  0.75 
  Legislature  0.5 
  
Executive collectively (e.g. council of 
ministers)  0.25 
  
One or two members of the executive 
branch  0 
 c. Dismissal   
  No provision for dismissal  1 
  Only for reasons not related to policy  0.83 
  At the discretion of central bank board  0.67 
  At legislature's discretion  0.5 
  
Unconditional dismissal possible by 
legislature  0.33 
  At executive's discretion  0.17 
  
Unconditional dismissal possible by 
executive  0 
 d. 
May CEO hold other offices in 
government?   
  No  1 
  
Only with permission of the executive 
branch  0.5 
  No rule against CEO holding other office  0 
2 Policy   0.15  
     
 a. Who formulates monetary policy?   
  Bank alone  1 
  Bank participates, but has little influence  0.67 
  Bank only advises government  0.33 
  Bank has no say  0 
 b. 
Who has final word in resolution of 
conflict?   
  
The bank, on issues clearly defined in the 
law as its objectives  1 
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Variables for Legal Central Bank Independence 
  
  
Government, on policy issues not clearly 
defined as the bank's goals or in case of   
   conflict within bank  0.8 
  
A council of the central bank, executive 
branch and legislative branch  0.6 
  The legislature, on policy issues  0.4 
  
The executive branch on policy issues, 
subject to due process and possible   
  protest by the bank  0.2 
  
The executive branch has unconditional 
priority  0 
 c. 
Role in the government's budgetary 
process   
  Central bank active  1 
  Central bank has no influence  0 
3 Objectives  0.15  
  
Price stability is the major or only 
objective in the charter, and the central 
bank has the final word in case of conflict 
with other government objectives   
  Price stability is the only objective  0.8 
  
Price stability is one goal, with other 
compatible objectives, such as a stable   
  banking system  0.6 
  
Price stability is one goal, with potentially 
conflicting objectives, such as full   
  employment  0.4 
  No objectives stated in the bank charter  0.2 
  
Stated objectives do not include price 
stability  0 
4 
Limitation 
on lending     
 a. 
Advances (limitation on non-securitized 
lending) 0.15  
  No advances permitted  1 
  
Advances permitted, but with strict limits 
(e.g., up to 15 percent of government    
  revenue)  .67 
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Variables for Legal Central Bank Independence 
  
  
Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., 
over 15 percent of government revenue)  0.33 
  No legal limits on lending  0 
 b. Securitized lending 0.1  
  Not permitted  1 
  
Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g, up to 
15 percent of government revenue)  0.67 
          
  
Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., 
over 15 percent of government revenue)  0.33 
  No legal limits on lending  0 
 c. 
Terms of lending (maturity, interest, 
amount) 0.1  
  Controlled by the bank  1 
  Specified by the bank charter  0.67 
  
Agreed between the central bank and 
executive  0.33 
  Decided by the executive branch alone  0 
 d. Potential borrowers from the bank 0.05  
  Only the central government  1 
  
All levels of the government (state as well 
as central)  0.67 
  
Those mentioned above and public 
enterprises  0.33 
  Public and private sector  0 
 e. Limits on central bank lending defined in  0.25  
  Currency amounts  1 
  
Shares of central bank demand liabilities or 
capital  0.67 
  Shares of government revenue  0.33 
  Shares of government expenditures  0 
 f. Maturity of loans 0.025  
  Within 6 months  1 
  Within 1 year  0.67 
  More than 1 year  0.33 
  No mention of maturity in the law  0 
 g. Interest rates on loans must be 0.025  
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Variables for Legal Central Bank Independence 
  
  Above minimum rates  1 
  At market rates  0.75 
  Below maximum rates  0.5 
  Interest rate is not mentioned  0.25 
  
No interest on government borrowing from 
the central bank  0 
           
 h. 
Central bank prohibited from buying or 
selling government securities in the    
   primary market? 0.025  
  Yes  1 
  No  0 
Note: The ranking of each criterion indicates the degree of independence of the central 
bank- the higher the code, the more independent the central bank. If the bank law does 
not mention specific criteria the variable is coded on the impression from reading the law 
in its entirety.90  
 
2. Aggregating the Legal Variables 
The data on the 16 legal variables listed in Table 1 are aggregated into eight legal 
variables. The weighted mean of the four variables capturing the appointment and term of 
office of the central bank governor are aggregated into a single variable of CEO. The 
three variables under policy formation were weighted and aggregated into a single mean. 
The objectives variable is treated separately as were the first four variables under limits to 
lending.  The last four variables in the limits to lending cluster were averaged with equal 
weights into one variable. In coding the degree of Iraq's Central Bank independence the 
length of the bank governor was assessed as 1. Central bank independence is directly 
correlated with the legal term of office for the bank governor.  Independence is also 
greater for a bank where the government has little legal authority in appointing or 
dismissing the governor.  Dr. Sinan Al-Shabibi has been Iraq's Central Bank governor 
since 2003. Moreover Article 13 of Iraq's central Bank Law stipulates that the executive 
                                                 
90 Central Bank of Iraq, “Central Bank of Iraq: Annex A,” (2004): 1, 
http://www.cbi.iq/documents/CBILAW-EN_f.pdf. 
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branch of Iraq's government has no legal authority to appoint or dismiss the Central Bank 
Governor.91 Formulating banking policy in Iraq is, by law, the exclusive domain of the 
CBI. Thus, the policy variable was coded as 1. In coding the objective of Iraq's Central 
Bank, there are six possible ratings, with prominence given to price stability. Article 3 of 
the CBI Law lists price stability as only one among other goals, including fostering and 
maintaining a stable and competitive market-based financial system, and promoting 
sustainable growth, employment, and prosperity in Iraq.92 Thus the rating for the 
category called central bank objective was 0.6. Tight limits on lending to the public 
sector signals increased bank independence. Since Article 26 authorizes unlimited CBI 
lending to government-owned commercial banks, the coding for this variable was .38.93   
3. Result of Study 
The aggregated and weighted score of the CBI independence was 0.64. This 
places the CBI’s independence on par with that of industrialized countries like 
Switzerland (.64) and Germany (.69).94   
Table 2.   Legal central Bank Independence 1980–1989 
Economy Legal Central Bank Independence Average Inflation Rate  
Germany 0.69 3 
Switzerland 0.64 3 
Austria 0.61 4 
Denmark 0.50 5 
United States 0.48 6 
                                                 
91 Ibid., 13. 
92 Ibid., 9. 
93 Ibid., 21. 
94 Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, Measuering the Independence of Central Banks and its Effect on 




This finding is consistent with empirical studies on Central Bank’s performance 
that concluded that independent central banks were better at targeting inflation.95  The 
finding is also consistent with studies showing a strong correlation between bank policies 
that focused on controlling inflation and bank independence.96 A summary of inflation in 
Iraq since 1980 depicts the following trend:97  
Period inflation average 
 1980–1995 10.6 percent 
 1986–1990 18.6 percent 
 1991–1995  250 percent 
 1995–2003 12.8 percent 
Policies put in place after 2003 set the dinar exchange rate as the main instrument 
for the CBI control of the inflation.98  But Iraq's inflation from 2004 to 2006 was 31.7, 
31.6 and 64.8 respectively.99  Iraq’s period of high inflation persisted because the Central 
Bank had kept the dinar exchange rate of 1460 dinar to U.S. dollar as determined by the 
CPA.  After 3 years of inaction, the CBI enacted policy to allow the dinar to appreciate 
against the dollar.100  The change in dinar exchange rate decreased Iraq’s inflation and 
has calmed inflation to single digits since 2007. This experience in Iraq is consistent with 
the recent research on the correlation of central banks independence with effectiveness at 
targeting inflation. 
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99 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq Statistical Appendix,” , no. July (2007): 7, 
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C. REFORM OF THE IRAQI DINAR 
As mentioned earlier, the CPA had three options for possible currency reforms:101 
 Dollarization -The outright adoption of the U.S. currency 
 A currency board - The dinar is backed one for one with U.S. reserves 
 A managed float - The dinar's value is set relative to major currencies  
By mid-October 2003, less than three months after the fall of Saddam, officials 
introduced a new Iraqi Dinar. The officials based their decision on the following five 
assumptions: 1) that a single currency would achieve the political objective of unifying 
the country; 2) that the technology in the new currency would be harder to counterfeit; 3) 
that monetary policy supporting the new currency would end past inflationary policies; 4) 
the increased supply of new notes would satisfy the demand for a broader range of 
denominations; and 5) that Iraqis would see a “fresh start” in a currency without the 
visage of Saddam Hussein.102 A major disadvantage of the Saddam dinars was the ease 
of counterfeiting due to the use of standard offset printing on wood-based paper and 
primitive security features. The Swiss dinars in the north presented a different set of 
problems. By 2003 those notes were at least 15 years old and they were in inadequate 
supply to finance transactions so they could not replace the Saddam dinar.  This scarcity 
was in part to blame for the relative appreciation of the Swiss dinar against both the 
Saddam dinar and the U.S. Dollar. Since Iraq did not have the technology to print new 
dinars the central bank had to find a currency printer with secure technology and volume 
capacity for new dinar notes.103  
The decision to remove Saddam’s image from Iraq’s dinar was easy.  The CPA 
believed that further deliberations on the design of the new dinar could take up to 18 
months, which would have been too long. Yet, Paul Bremer judged that the occupying 
powers should not be perceived to have imposed a new currency on Iraq. After 
discussions with officials from the CBI, Acting Governor Faleh Salman agreed that his 
                                                 
101 Nouoriel Roubini and Brad Setser, “Should Iraq Dollarize, Adopt a Currency Board Or Let its 
Currency Float? A Policy Analysis,” Council of Foreign Relations, no. May (2003): 4, 
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signature should be incorporated in the design elements.  Other members of the CBI 
concluded that re-issuing the old illustrations from the pre-1990 Swiss dinar would be 
popularly accepted since they predated the Saddam dinar and “those designs reflect[ed] 
Iraq’s culture, history and contemporary life.”104  
 
 






                                                 
104 Ibid., 42. 
105 “Dinar Set,” Sarah Rose, http://www.sahararose.net/dinarset.html. 
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Figure 3.   New Iraqi Dinar.106 
The 10,000 Dinar front depicts the image of Abu Ali Hasan Ibn al-Haitham who 
was born in 965 A.D. in Basra and was a prominent scientist and mathematician during 
the ‘Golden Age’ of Muslim civilization.  Al-Haitham wrote over 200 books on matters 
such as optics, algebra and geometry and he gave the first modern explanation of human 
vision. The back of the 10000 Dinar depicts the Hadba Minaret at the Great Nurid 
Mosque in Mosul that was built 1172 A.D.107  
Table 3.   Total Dinar Banknote order created during the currency exchange. 
Denomination Notes (millions) Value (billions) Percent of volume Percent of value
50 276 13.8 8.49 .11 
250 1,108 277 34.09 2.2 
1000 881 881 27.11 7 
5000 415 2,075 12.77 16.48 
10000 327 3,270 10.06 25.97 
25000 243 6,075 7.48 48.25 
Total 3,250 12,591.8 100 100 
                                                 
106 “Iraq Currency,” Iraq News World, http://www.iraqnewsworld.com/iraq-currency.html. 
107 Gray and Nell, A New Currency for Iraq, 95. 
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The CPA promulgated a public information campaign that involved strategic use 
of print TV and radio outlets. The campaign was executed in two phases. Phase one 
focused on informing the Iraqi public about the basic facts and rationale for the currency 
exchange. Phase two of the information campaign involved revealing details about the 
design of the new dinar bank notes in order to familiarize Iraqis about the currency.108 
The CPA’s media strategy included: 
1. A traveling roadshow targeting Iraqi government officials  
2. Posters and handbills detailing the currency exchange locations, timing and 
dinar conversion rates 
3. Television and radio public service announcements 
In carrying out the roadshow, CPA officials visited all 17 governorates outside 
Baghdad. “Often the meetings were with the Governing Council for the Governorate, or 
local district council, and ranged in size form 250 community leaders in Mosul to 5 local 
businessmen in An Nasiriyah.  Local journalists were usually invited to attend the 
roadshow events, and time was set aside for press events around the presentations.”109 
The CPA relied on coalition troops to distribute approximately two million handbills and 
270,000 posters in Arabic and Sorani Kurdish dialect. “The troops and contacts charged 
with distributing the handbill face-to-face were supplied with talking points—a “Q and 
A” style script—to help answer questions members of the public might have.”110 Due to 
time constraints, the CPA declined to translate handbills into other languages spoken in 
Iraq. For the television and radio campaign the CPA set up an Arabic language facility 
under the Iraqi Media Network and broadcasted two news programs daily. The message 
promulgated during these broadcast matched the script of the handbill and the roadshow.  
“Although the Iraqi Media Network was not universally credible, its wide reach and the 
frequency of the message helped to raise awareness of the currency exchange.”111  
In order to not disrupt Iraq’s financial markets, the CPA privately contacted 
several international currency printers to find a competitive price and a capable supplier 
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for Iraq’s new banknotes. Seemingly minor details such as whether to use polymer or 
paper notes challenged the administration due to budgetary constraints (polymer costs 
more than paper). Other deliberations involved whether a future administration would 
redesign the currency and whether inflation might produce the need for different 
denominations to be printed.112 The officials concluded that the new dinar notes would 
be 100 percent cotton paper with watermark security threads, and feature lithographic 
intaglio front and back printing. The British firm De La Rue (DLR) received the no-bid 
printing contract. DLR’s used a consortium of international printing facilities and 
suppliers including DLR plants in Sri Lanka, Kenya, Malta and the UK.  Simultaneous 
printing at the distributed plants greatly accelerated the production of the new 
banknotes.113  
The CPA involved the CBI and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
determining the standard range of currency denominations.  The IMF relied on the 
experience of changing currencies in the Former Soviet Union in the early 1990s to guide 
the planning of dinar exchange.114  The advice from the IMF was to base the frequency 
of the denominations on the daily wage.  Unfortunately, in 2003 there was no reliable 
labor market data on wages in Iraq. “The average public sector salaries of around 180,000 
dinars per month or 3,000 dinars per day [and] reported daily laborer rates of 2,000 dinars 
a day implied that the most popular note should be in the range of 300–600 dinars.”115  
However, administrators decided on a lower-denomination frequency of 1,000 dinars and 
that the 250 dinar note should be the most common denomination.116  The new 
denominations included 50, 250, 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 25,000 dinar notes. The 
assumption that there were 4.5 trillion dinars in circulation (around 2.5 billion USD) led 
the administrators to conclude that an initial production of 6 trillion new dinars would 
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create a sufficient buffer stock (approximately 30 percent of the required note issue). 
Although the buffer stock was on the low side, it was all that the DLR could produce in 
time for the planned currency exchange.117   
The CPA set the swap rate at 1:1 between Iraq’s new Dinar and the Saddam 
Dinar. Reaching an agreement on the exchange rate for the Swiss Dinar used in the 
Kurdish area was more contentious.  A high exchange rate would produce the short-term 
benefit of increased wealth in the Kurdish regions but reduced competitiveness over time.  
An artificially low exchange rate would engender the feeling of impoverishment.  “After 
extensive economic modeling, it was decided to set the swap rate at 150:1, substantially 
below the market rate, in order to avoid recreating the East German problem, where 
setting the Ostmark swap rate for the Deutsche Mark too high had made the economy 
uncompetitive and been responsible for years of low growth and high unemployment.”118 
Once the New Dinars were printed the CPA had to tackle the logistics and security 
arrangements for currency distribution. 
The logistical difficulty of delivering the new dinars and collecting the old 
currency in war-torn Iraq was compounded by the security arrangements required for 
protecting the currency during transition and at bank locations.  CPA officials 
coordinated convoy teams of coalition military forces and private contractors to clear 
routes and shuffle the currency from distribution hubs to the banks and back. In the 
Baghdad region the CPA contracted armored cars to deliver and exchange dinars. Since 
the Kurdish region remained under the security of an enforced no-fly zone, authorities 
used air transport to the Suleimaniyah and Irbil airports to exchange currency in that 
region.119  
Security at Iraqi banks and other exchange locations was manpower and time 
intensive. The CPA estimated that security at the 244 exchange locations required 20 
personnel over a 24-hour period. Given the enormous demand, it was clear to officials 
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that coalition military personnel did not have the capacity for that security task. Given the 
additional demands that the currency security force have a national presence and 
authority to detain and arrest, officials concluded that the most suitable choice was the 
Iraqi Police.120  The CPA divided the currency exchange operation into three phases: 
Phase 1) positioning phase based on identifying and preparing the hubs and exchange 
locations beginning in October 2003; Phase 2) dinar resupply and pickup; and Phase 3) 
operation closedown which involved collecting remnants of old currency and 
transitioning bank operations to CBI control. The CPA dinar exchange ended in February 
2004 when the CBI assumed authority over the remaining elements of the operation.121  
D. EVALUATION OF CURRENCY EXCHANGE 
Once the CPA made the decision that creating a new dinar was the optimal choice 
for fixing Iraq’s currency issues they had to design and print the currency, redenominate 
notes, set the exchange rate and finally swap the currency under extreme conditions of 
insecurity.  The CPA successfully coordinated with Iraq’s CBI and the IMF on the design 
of the new dinar, and how to integrate the competing dinars circulating in the economy. 
The decision to use the Iraqi Police for point security at bank locations was controversial. 
In 2003 the Iraqi Police was poorly trained, inadequately staffed and not trusted. Using 
the police for such an important mission was a huge gamble but it paid off. All aspects of 
the currency exchange were successful at achieving their political and economic goals. 
The creation of a new Iraqi dinar based on the pre-Saddam note broke the psychological 
link between the Iraqis and Saddam’s regime. And any economic restart in Iraq was 
preconditioned on a stable national currency under an Iraqi Central Bank with the 
authority to target inflation and manage exchange rates. The violence that existed in Iraq 
in 2003 made all forms of transportation difficult, especially trafficking currency for the 
dinar exchange. The CPA successfully flew 2,600 tons of new currency, using 41 sorties 
into Baghdad. They then managed hundreds of fixed-wing currency transports and road 
convoys throughout North and South Iraq using Iraqi police, coalition military and 
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contract guards. The fact that there was no reported security incident involving the 
currency exchange operation only proves the remarkable success of that mission.122  
 
Figure 4.   Positioning the New Currency123 
Security was another concern that motivated the hasty pace of economic reforms. 
The planners were cautious to prevent the extensive looting and bank robberies that 
occurred during the post-war looting. Thus the currency exchange was divided into three 
rapid-fire operational phases; positioning, resupply/pickup, and closedown. The 
positioning phase took place from October 4 to October 15.  During this phase new dinars 
were positioned at regional hubs.  
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123 Gray and Nell, A New Currency for Iraq, 94. 
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Figure 5.   Resupply and Pickup124 
E. SHOCK THERAPY AND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
Within the space of 14 months the CPA issued 100 administrative orders that 
reset operations within Iraq including its economy. The political motivation behind this 
shock therapy was to introduce reforms quickly to circumvent interference from Baathist 
and others members of the old guard.125  “The reforms clearly incorporate much of the 
agenda originally laid out in the Washington Consensus.  The main thrust of the 
Washington Consensus is a set of actions which, if taken at an early stage of transition, 
should facilitate a smooth evolution into the world economy.”126  The set of actions 
outlined by the Washington Consensus calls for privatization, cuts in fiscal deficits and 
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subsidies, removal of trade barriers and the free flow of international capital.127  The 
CPA Orders 18, 20, 40, 43, 74 and 94 liberalized Iraq’s monetary system. Orders 39, 46, 
and 51 sought to immediately privatize state owned enterprises.128  
The treat of resistance to the economic reform was a strong motivator for shock 
therapy. Resistance to economic reform takes a variety of forms, some constructive and 
beneficial while others are destructive and characterized by elites who enjoyed privileged 
arrangements with the existing regime.  The absence of a strong civil society, mature 
institutions and political parties in Iraq aroused the fear of the destructive resistance to 
economic reform.  The resisters were capable of blocking reforms from being introduced, 
preventing implementation or distorting the reform process in self-serving ways.  
The CPA’s program of shock therapy also faced legal challenges under The 
Hague Regulation and Geneva Convention. According to Article 43 of The Hague 
Regulations an occupying power should “restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public 
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country.”129 Article 64 of the Geneva Convention further constrains the rule making 
authority of the occupying power to enacting “provisions which are essential to enable 
the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations.”130  Thus, critics have argued that the 
CPA’s economic reforms that were implemented under shock therapy went beyond the 
limits of both the Hague regulation and the Geneva Convention. “Nowhere does 
permission for the restructuring of the Iraqi economy, for introducing WTO compliant 
policies or for passing laws that propel the economy into reliance upon foreign capital 
feature in any of the UN resolutions that gave legitimacy to the CPA.”131  Others had 
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argued that although the CPA’s economic reform process did not formally include 
ordinary Iraqis in decision-making, the involvement of Iraq’s governing Council ensured 
that decisions would prove lasting and effective. 132   
F. EVALUATION OF SHOCK THERAPY  
The question of CPA legal authority in Iraq would suggest that orders initiated by 
the CPA and the transitional government would be revoked or substantially modified by 
an independent government. Substantial modifications to the CPA orders would 
corroborate the charge that shock therapy’s failure to solicit input from local Iraqis. Yet a 
comparison of the CPA Central Bank Law implemented in 2003 and the current CBI 
Bank Law clearly indicates no significant changes.  In fact the CPA orders that structured 
the CBI and outlined its major macroeconomic policies since 2003 have remained 
unchanged in both letter and spirit. In spite of these reforms the economic situation in 
Iraq remains unremarkable. “As a matter of fact, since the war ended, the implemented 
economic measures and the actual expenditures have neither increased domestic 
production and productive employment nor improved the living standards of the majority 
of the people.”133 Given the continued poor performance of Iraq’s economy it begs the 
question why officials have not deviated from the Washington Consensus. One probable 
explanation for why the Iraqi authorities have resisted interfering with the 
macroeconomic system imposed under the CPA’s occupation is that the dominance of oil 
revenues in the Iraqi economy.  
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Figure 6.   Iraqi Year to Date Revenue from Oil Exports 134 
The argument for sequencing economic reforms had merit especially given the 
fact that Iraq’s economy continued to suffer from a combined political and economic 
challenges. Ironically, it might have been the government’s over reliance on oil exports 
for funding operations that has both retarded economic development and also created the 
space for developing independent macroeconomic institutions. 
                                                 




This thesis measured three aspects of the CPA’s macroeconomic reforms for 
transitioning Postwar Iraq; the degree of CBI independence; the success of the currency 
exchange; and whether the program of shock therapy weakened macroeconomic reforms. 
The premise behind implementing liberal economic reforms in Iraq was that creating a 
market-oriented economy would increase internal stability and would integrate Iraq into 
the global economy. Moreover, an integrated Iraqi government would be less likely to 
engage in hostile action against its own population or its neighbors. Experts agreed that 
transforming Iraq’s banking system would be an important milestone for the post war 
reconstruction. The consensus view was that an Iraq with an independent central bank 
would be more credible at implementing rational economic policies such as controlling 
inflation.135  Although CPA Order 56 legislated CBI independence, there existed no 
empirical measure of the bank’s independence from the executive branch of the 
government.  This thesis measured the actual degree of CBI independence using the most 
widely accepted measure established by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti. According to 
this measurement Iraq’s central bank rated an independence score of .64.  This thesis also 
examined the CBI effectiveness at targeting inflation, which is another indicator of 
central bank independence. Between 1980 and 2003 Iraq’s average inflation rate 
remained in the double digits, which suggest that the Central Bank independence and 
credibility was quite low.136   In 2006, CBI authorities increased the dinar exchange rate 
by 20 percent to generate dinar demand.137  That move resulted in the decline of inflation 
from a high of 76.6 percent in August 2006 to 4.7 percent in December 2007. Currently 
Iraq’s rate of inflation remains in single digits.138  
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The dinar consolidation unified Iraq’s dual monetary system. Moreover, the new 
bank notes helped erase Saddam’s legacy of economic incompetence.  The transition to 
an independent central bank introduced professional management of Iraq’s economy. But 
broad economic development remains elusive in Iraq. At present, crude oil satisfies over 
90 percent of Iraq’s domestic energy consumption and oil exports generate over 90 
percent of Iraq’s government revenue.139  “Revenues from the sale of oil resources are 
the engine of Iraq’s national economy and the lifeblood of its national budget. Iraq’s 
state-owned oil production and marketing system ensures that revenue from the export 
and sale of Iraqi oil accrues to the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi people’s elected 
representatives are now responsible for administering that revenue to meet the country’s 
considerable development needs.”140 The persistence of poor economic performance begs 
the question as to why the CPA’s macroeconomic reforms persist.  The dominance of oil 
revenue in funding Iraq’s government operations may explain why politicians have 
largely ignored macroeconomic policy.  The dominance of oil interests overshadows the 
domestic economy and directs government attention away from central banking policy. 
Since 2003 the Iraqi government has largely ignored CBI independence but has issued 
several new decrees for increased authority over the oil ministries.141  Central bank 
independence should persist as long as oil exports continue to produce annual budget 
surpluses in Iraq. Thus, the current focus of Iraqi politicians is on the role and authority 
of federal and regional government in oil policy, foreign participation in oil and gas 
production and the mechanisms for revenue sharing.142   
The question implied by this research is whether the CPA's economic reform 
delivered broad economic growth in Iraq. The examined literature is by no means 
conclusive on this matter. The result of CPA's implementation of the Washington 
consensus in Iraq is mixed. Indeed even under the most optimal conditions 
macroeconomic policy is no silver bullet.  The effort was constrained in particular by an 
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Iraqi economy that lacked skilled professionals in the banking industry and more 
generally hobbled by the legacy of government control over the economy.  The Middle 
East is a region of notorious resistance to economic and political reform. The conclusion 
that drawn from this analysis is that the CPA's broad attempt to distance the banking 
sector from government influence was successful, though incomplete. The targeted 
banking area was but one sector of Iraq's economy and reforms in that area should not be 
viewed as necessarily capable of delivering broad and sustained economic growth. The 
policy implications of this research suggests that while implementing controversial and 
dogmatic programs such as the neoliberal economic reform can produce lasting changes, 
the benefits are limited to the specific policy targets. Even so, the partial success of such 
programs foster credible hope in terms of transitioning statist economies out of the hands 
of the government onto professional managers who may be motivated by empirical 
incentives.  
This thesis determined that the CPA’s rapid implementation of central bank 
independence and currency unification transitioned Iraq’s economy from a symbol of 
Saddam’s corrupt regime into a fledgling modern system. The selection of shock therapy 
introduced a large amount of uncertainty about the sustainability of neoliberal economic 
reforms. In spite of the CPA’s macroeconomic reforms, Iraq’s economy remains 
undiversified and reliant on revenue from oil export. Although the monetary reforms of a 
single stable currency and an independent central bank were important to liberating Iraq, 
macroeconomic policy is but one instrument that addresses specific aspects of a broader 
economic situation. This is especially the case in transitioning statist and resource 
exporting countries such as Iraq.  
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Figure 7.   Per Capita GDP in Iraq (1968–2001)143 
Iraq has politically transitioned, but the economy remains hampered by the 
persistent violence and stagnation.  Research suggests that the level of violence is closely 
correlated with the economic performance. Although there is a chicken and egg 
relationship between violence and economic opportunity recent polls indicate Iraqis 
believe that increased economic opportunity would quell the violence.144 Whether Iraq 
diversifies and transforms into a modern market-oriented economy is uncertain. What is 
certain is that the CPA’s neoliberal reforms have produced lasting transformations, 
including the necessary groundwork for the further development of independent 
macroeconomic institutions. 
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